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Abstract
Like a giant oil tanker, the world is turning. New growth poles of the world economy have 
been emerging in the south and east. Globalization once belonged to the west and now the 
tables are turning. We have entered the era of the ‘rise of the rest’. Western media and poli-
tics of representation have celebrated the rise of the west for two hundred years, how then 
do they represent the rise of the rest? The main trends are that the rise of the rest is ignored, 
or represented as a threat, or celebrated in business media as triumphs of the marketplace. 
Media echoing free market ideology have contributed to vast wealth polarization; represent-
ing the rise of the rest as threat contributes to global political polarization; recycling the 
9/11 complex produces cultural and political polarization; and overusing celebrity narratives 
contributes to existential polarization. These are the global divides discussed in this paper. 
In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008 there have been marked changes in discourse 
and a new motif has taken shape: recruiting the rest to rescue the west.
Keywords: globalization, emerging societies, media representations, market ideology, 
recyc ling 9/11, celebrity narratives, before and after crisis.
Introduction
In the buildup to the Iraq war mainstream media were asleep at the wheel. Mesmerized 
by the 9/11 attacks and the machinations of power, mainstream media, particularly in 
the US and UK, allowed the Iraq war to unfold and placed no obstacles in its course. 
This is widely discussed; here let us consider other media contributions to creating 
or sustaining global divides. I focus on the following: echoing free market ideology, 
representing the rise of the rest as threat, recycling the 9/11 complex, and overusing 
celebrity as narrative.1 
The setting of this discussion is that we are in a dramatic vortex. Like a giant oil 
tanker, the world is slowly turning. The emerging centers of the world economy and 
world society are in the south and east. Globalization once seemed to belong to the west 
and now the tables are turning. We have entered the era of the ‘rise of the rest’ – in an 
economic sense in that industries and multinationals in the south play an increasingly 
important role; in a financial sense with a view to sovereign wealth funds; in a policy 
and political sense, in international trade policy and the G20; but less so in a cultural 
Plenary I. Media and Global Divides
58
sense.2 Western media and representations have celebrated the rise of the west for some 
two hundred years, how then do they address the rise of the rest? 
The main trends are that the rise of the rest is ignored because it doesn’t fit national 
narratives in the west, or is represented as a threat because it fits or extends existing 
enemy images, or is celebrated in business media as triumphs of the marketplace. A 
summary headline version of this argument might run: western media complacent, dis-
play west-bias. In frequently representing twenty-first century globalization as a source 
of risk, western media exemplify western privilege and conservatism. Downstream, as 
mainstream media ignore the rise of the rest, they reinforce the relations between the 
rest and the rest, rather than between the rest and the west, and may thus contribute to 
the creeping irrelevance of the west. Table 1 gives a précis of the main arguments. 
Table 1. Media and Global Divides
 Media Global Divides
 Promoting free market ideology Wealth polarization
 Representing rise of rest as threat Economic and political polarization 
 Cultivating the 9/11 complex  Political and cultural polarization
 Overusing celebrity narratives Existential polarization between  
  celebrities and common masses
The treatment follows the sequence of these arguments. Recycling the 9/11 complex is 
part of a wider problematic of representing war, to which I also devote a brief section. 
The emphasis in this discussion is on western mainstream media; in a closing section I 
make brief observations on the way media in the global south represent contemporary 
trends in globalization. The article closes with a reflection on representations before 
and after the crisis of 2008.
Free Market Paradox
I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically 
banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their own 
shareholders. (Alan Greenspan, US Congress, October 2008) 
In his last published article Jan Ekecrantz (2007) urges media studies to pay more at-
tention to economic inequality and the role of media in sustaining and representing 
inequality. An immediately pressing question is, after decades of echoing and wor-
shiping ‘market forces’, now that the ‘free market’ goes kaput, now what? For years 
western media passed on the admonitions of the free market gospel, the Nobel Prize 
winning economists of the Chicago school, the stipulations of the IMF and World Bank 
and the tropes of the Washington consensus – don’t intervene in the market, rollback 
government, liberalize, privatize, lift capital controls, the free market and democracy 
go together. When crisis hit developing countries IMF conditions invariably stipulated 
cutting government spending. 
Since 2008 everything is topsy-turvy. Crises are supposed to take place in develop-
ing countries and to serve as instruments to discipline and punish the periphery and its 
unruly elites. Now financial crisis hits the United States and Europe – it is regarded as 
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the most serious crisis since the Depression – and by mid 2008 the same economists who 
counseled liberalization and market shock therapy for developing and post-communist 
countries – such as Larry Summers and Jeffrey Sachs – plead for American government 
spending and large public works programs to stimulate the economy. 
For decades people were told that the free market is superior, is the only viable 
economic model, there is no alternative – but now that the ‘free market’ is in trouble, 
sovereign wealth funds rescue Wall Street power houses. State capitalism – declared old 
fashioned and ineffective by the western establishment’s power/knowledge grid – comes 
to the rescue as the free market goes down the toilet. According to Martin Wolf, the day 
the US government bailed out Bear Stearns with $30 billion, was ‘the day the dream of 
global free market-capitalism died’. 
Remember Friday March 14 2008: it was the day the dream of global free market-
capitalism died. For three decades we have moved towards market-driven financial 
systems. By its decision to rescue Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve, the institution 
responsible for monetary policy in the US, chief protagonist of free-market capital-
ism, declared this era over. It showed in deeds its agreement with the remark by 
Joseph Ackermann, chief executive of Deutsche Bank, that “I no longer believe 
in the market’s self-healing power”. Deregulation has reached its limits. … The 
US is showing the limits of deregulation… we must start in the right place, by 
recognising that even the recent past is a foreign country. (Wolf, 2008)
Since then there have been many days like that. In the course of 2008, with bailouts 
climbing to $700 billion and on to trillions, those seem days of innocence. There go the 
banks, the hedge funds, the rating agencies, the boards and for that matter, the business 
pages – each led by the smartest people in the room, now queuing up at the exit. One 
may cherish the irony of this historical twist, but it is do-it-yourself irony because media 
rarely concede the u-turn and appear oblivious to the gaping contradiction between 25 
years of propagating the ‘free market’ and the u-turn of 2008. If you like world history, 
2008 and 2009 are good years. 
By echoing free market rhetoric unhindered, media have contributed to massive, 
unprecedented transfers of wealth within countries and on a global scale, a vast wealth 
polarization in which, according to UNDP figures, some 350 billionaires own as much 
as half the world population (UNDP 1994; Nederveen Pieterse 2004). Through 25 years 
of free market propaganda media have been dozing at the wheel and under the head-
ing of trickle down have enabled or permitted the rapid and steep growth of inequality 
within and between societies. However, should we not concede that social inequality is 
nowadays mostly caused by technological change, which brings about skills differentials, 
and by the effects of globalization? Not per se. It is possible to combine innovation and 
economic dynamism and equity. Contrast Scandinavia, Nordic Europe and East Asia 
with the US, UK and the developing countries that underwent structural adjustment. 
Technological change does not cause inequality; political change does. 
One might argue, too, that when banks, boards, rating agencies, hedge funds and ana-
lysts all lost marbles because they miscalculated risk, how could media have done better? 
The point is, however, that by falling in line with propaganda and joining the free market 
bandwagon and by failing to inculcate civic vigilance, media contributed to a climate 
of lax regulation and permissive capitalism which, in turn, fostered creative accounting 
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and corporations making the quarterly numbers by cooking the books. In time this set 
of processes produced the Enron and Anderson series of corporate scandals (2001), the 
subprime mortgage crisis (2007) and the financial and economic crisis of 2008. 
To the extent that business media are an exception in representing the rise of the rest 
in a positive light, they tend to display a different bias: ‘what is good for market forces is 
good for society’. When the west was winning, when it drove and ‘owned’ globalization, 
free market stories sounded acceptable and attractive. The world is flat and outsourcing 
is beneficial in the end. Now it appears it has all been bubbles all along – the high tech 
bubble, dotcom bubble, easy money bubble, real estate bubble, consumer credit bubble, 
merger and acquisitions bubble, the petrol and commodities bubbles, and now the bailout 
and economic stimulus bubbles. Media followed and fed each of these bubbles. 
This includes the role of media as market forces. Media play a major role in market 
development. Hugo Slim, the world’s wealthiest man, made his fortune in Mexico’s tel-
ecoms. Thaksin Shinawatra made his fortune by selling computers to Thailand’s police 
force and then became a telecom magnate. Berlusconi is Italy’s media tycoon and Bill 
Gates’ wealth is well known. Dan Schiller has discussed the role of media and telecoms 
in the era of digital capitalism (1999) as did Susan Strange (1996). The deregulation of 
American telecoms in the nineties was a major contributor to the financialization of the 
US economy (Phillips 2006) and to the Wall Street frenzy that, in time, produced the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals. All along media, of course, are major political forces 
as well. Conrad Black maintained links with rightwing think tanks. Rupert Murdoch’s 
media have contributed to pro-market propaganda. American media are deeply wired 
into the military-industrial-media complex.3
The paradox of liberalization is that under the banner of the ‘free market’, market 
forces have been cast as panacea. Business media and accounts such as Thomas Fried-
man’s (2005) have attributed the rise of Asia, China and India to liberalization; to Deng’s 
modernization in China in 1981 and India’s financial liberalization in 1991. Likewise 
the World Bank attributed the ‘East Asian miracle’ to export orientation and economic 
liberalization. Let me make some brief points in relation to this account.
This narrative overlooks the role of the public sector. In each of these cases the de-
velopmental state played a fundamental role in establishing the conditions that made 
market growth possible, from education, infrastructure and land reform in East Asia to 
Mao’s reforms in China and Nehru’s reforms in India. This is typically being ignored in 
Anglo-American free enterprise accounts of economic success. Washington orthodoxy 
is about paradigm maintenance, as Robert Wade shows (1996, 2002). 
‘Freedom’ has historically been a language of power and a doctrine of hegemons 
(Wallerstein 1984) so the free market is a doctrine of winners. Now winners are becom-
ing losers and the discourse and policies shift to protectionism. This leads to strange 
headlines such as ‘Obama vows to help restore US faith in globalization’ (Financial 
Times, June 27, 2008). The article deals, of course, with trade policy and the then 
senator’s criticisms of Nafta; yet since he is also ‘a free trader’, he seeks to ‘improve 
Nafta.’
As the new industrialization in the global south produces a commodities boom, in-
cluding high petrol prices, high commodity prices have a relatively equalizing impact 
in the world economy, as during the postwar economic boom. Western representations 
zero in on the downside of these trends. Thus, according to Thomas Friedman, the ‘first 
61
law of petro politics’ is ‘that the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in 
opposite directions’. Cases that prove his point are Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria and Russia 
(Friedman 2006). Aside from criticisms of Hugo Chávez, the message between the lines 
is that Friedman treasures the American way and bemoans the growth of state capital-
ism. But the selection of cases is biased. If oil states support American policies, such as 
Saudi Arabia, petro politics poses no problem (see Vitalis 2006); the problem, rather, 
is unruly petro politics. Besides, with the hindsight of 2008, freedom and the American 
way take on different meanings. 
Goldilocks Globalization Changed Place
According to opinion surveys in the nineties, people in the west generally felt that the 
pace of globalization was just right – not too fast, not too slow. However, according 
to a Pew survey in 2007, 57 percent in G7 countries feel that the pace of globalization 
is ‘too fast’, whereas the majority in the global south deems its pace just right.4 Thus, 
Goldilocks globalization has changed places. 
In the nineties the global south felt threatened and overwhelmed by globalization. The 
risks of liberalization and financial crisis were real enough and culminated in the 1997 
Asian crisis. Into the twenty-first century, advanced countries feel threatened by job loss 
and, in the US, by mounting trade and external deficits. According to populist views, 
competition from the south threatens job loss and undermines prosperity in the west. 
What mainstream media do not discuss, however, is the comparison between western 
countries: why are Scandinavia, Germany and other parts of Europe able to combine 
innovation, economic dynamism and a welfare state, whereas the US and UK are not. 
Decades of private sector underinvestment in American plants, technologies and innova-
tion is the other side of the story that is lost (discussed in Nederveen Pieterse 2008a). 
In American media, the problem has long been, rather, China and its undervalued 
renminbi, its cheap exports, its excessive savings, its thirst for commodities and energy. 
Complaints about China’s currency run from media to congress and the treasury and 
make a policy point: forcing upon China a similar devaluation of its currency as Japan 
accepted in the 1985 Plaza Accord, which made Japan’s exports to the US much less 
competitive. China’s has learned Japan’s lesson. By end 2008 US pressure on China 
to devalue its currency has still come to naught. China bashing signals a shift: in the 
nineties China’s vast growing consumer market was a dream come true for western mul-
tinationals; in the 2000s it is treated as a threat. China is criticized for its human rights 
record and for increasing its military spending. After the crisis, in the course of 2008, the 
discourse in some respects shifts again (discussed below). The underlying script change 
is that the drivers and winners of globalization, particularly during the closing decades 
of the twentieth century, are becoming losers in the twenty-first century. At issue, of 
course, are not merely representations but also policies. Not just attitudes and media, 
but also policies are changing – advanced countries that used to push free trade now opt 
for protectionism, not just in agriculture but also in manufactured goods. 
A further twist is the idea that the rise of the rest threatens the global environment. 
The rise of middle class consumption standards for growing numbers in China, India, 
Brazil and other developing countries competes with resource use and consumption 
standards in the west. Indulge for a few hundred years in uncontrolled modernization 
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and then cast the rise of the rest as a threat to planetary survival. Four percent of the 
world population in the United States has been absorbing 40 percent of the world’s 
resources – and now the consumption of rising middle classes in developing countries 
is viewed as a threat to the global environment. 
The 9/11 Complex
In academia and social science Eurocentrism has been taken to the cleaners by Edward 
Said, Samir Amin and in postcolonial studies;5 but it has made a comeback in media and 
politics, particularly in relation to Islam. In history and art the contributions of Islam 
to science and civilization as a broad and early cosmopolitanism have been increas-
ingly widely recognized; but in western political discourse the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
prevails. 
The 9/11 complex has turned into a western cul de sac. Go to Brazil, South Africa, 
South Korea, in fact to most of the world and the American and west European obses-
sion with the Middle East and Islam just doesn’t exist. This is the west’s special front 
seat in the gallery of paranoia. Everything to do with Islam and the Middle East is 
tainted with threat. In 2008 the number of terrorism suspects on American security lists 
exceeds a million. 
War-on-terror tunnel vision homogenizes Islam and treats Islam as threat. This is a 
boon for security experts, for terrorism is the successor to the cold war; for rightwing 
parties – who also have to make do without a communist enemy; and for western media 
– for media love a ready-made narrative. As Abrahamanian (2003) points out, American 
media have without fail interpreted 9/11 through the lens of Samuel Huntington’s clash 
of civilizations perspective. 
Media such as Copenhagen’s Jyllands-Posten and Charlie Hebdo in Paris have vol-
unteered to serve as frontiers in this clash of civilizations. Mainstream media follow 
or allow rightwing populist trends in the west, notably in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Italy, Austria and the US. These trends merge anti-immigrant senti-
ment, denigration of Islam and ignorant or hostile images of the global south. The Pim 
Fortuyn (‘the Netherlands is full’) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali strands recycle Orientalism.6 
Italian media in 2008 have scapegoated and targeted Roma people. At times manufactur-
ing or cultivating these cultural tensions serves to distract attention from political and 
economic transformations or geopolitical objectives. Anti-immigrant sentiment in the 
US and Europe is another expression of globalization worries. For some time, immigra-
tion has been a flashpoint of global inequality, an intersection of western labor demand, 
border controls and global inequality. 
The clash of civilizations is an imagined clash, or a political scenario masquerading 
as cultural friction. Apply double standards to the Middle East for decades (the official 
terminology is the ‘roadmap to peace’) and eventually it boomerangs, especially since 
the region is also the recipient of major petrol revenues. The clash of civilizations is a 
self fulfilling prophecy. View the world through lenses of perverse Orientalism and the 
Middle East hits back. Some argue that attacks on Islam such as the Danish cartoons 
may serve to deflect attention from Israel-Palestine tensions (Petras 2006).
With the 9/11 complex also comes a trans-Atlantic dispute, the Christopher Hitchens 
dispute, in which the English assure the Americans: You can keep him. And in increas-
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ing numbers Americans respond, It’s fine; you can have him back. In fact, please take 
him back! 
Representing War
Media reflect – stage manage, produce – the different sides to war. Over time media 
representations of war, at any rate on the part of war parties, have become more, not less 
biased because war is increasingly conducted via airspace with media as major arenas 
of psychological warfare and black information on the frontlines of public opinion. 
Media representations in the US particularly of conflicts in the Middle East and 
adjacent regions and of Israel’s policies often diverge from those in the region, clearly 
so during the neoconservative project of ‘transforming the Middle East’, as a glance 
at CNN and, in contrast, Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and other Mideast media shows. US 
secretary of state Madeline Albright declaring in 1996 of the death of half a million Iraqi 
children under five because of US sanctions, ‘we think the price is worth it’, exemplifies 
the divide. Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice’s statement, as Israel’s devastation of 
Lebanon was underway in August 2006, that ‘a new Middle East is being born’, was 
tone deaf to sentiments in the region. 
For years Afghan President Hamid Karzai protests at regular intervals that American 
air raids killing Afghan civilians are unacceptable and intolerable, without noticeable 
effect on operations. American air raids have spread to Pakistan’s border areas and 
since November 2008 to non-tribal areas such as Bajjaur. In late 2008 Pakistan’s prime 
minister has begun to voice similar criticisms. Meanwhile public perceptions in both 
countries are that the air operations are part of an arrangement with the Americans and 
political leaders go through the motions of protesting for legitimacy’s sake. 
Reporting of the clash between Georgia and Russia in summer 2008 has been one-
sided; for critical treatments one must search far off the beaten track. Also according to 
otherwise reasonably independent sources, Russia’s intervention in Georgia signals the 
re-emergence of a totalitarian regime. Philip Stephens (2008a) in the Financial Times 
compares Russia’s actions to those of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. New York 
Times op-ed columns feature language such as this: ‘W. [short for George W. Bush] and 
Condi are suddenly waking up to how vicious Vladimir is.’ Citing Georgia’s president 
Saakashvili’s view of Putin (‘today we are looking evil directly in the eye’), Maureen 
Dowd casually uses the language of ‘evil’ (2008). It is a small step from rehearsing 
unexamined assumptions to war mongering. Months later, in autumn 2008, reports 
emerged, among others via the BBC, that Georgia’s forces had used indiscriminate 
violence against civilians and homes in South Ossetia, which Russia responded to 
with proportional restraint – the opposite of the account that had been circulating for 
months. By the time these reports emerged the story was long off the front pages and 
the rites of indignation had come and gone. It takes little for mainstream media to slip 
into established narratives but it takes a lot to self correct and to break narratives, a lot 
more than is usually available. 
Reporting on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan is extensive but biased. Regarding 
Darfur the public knows about the ‘Janjaweed’ and images of parched stretches of 
land, but has little information about problems of water that underlie ethnic strife and 
conflicts with Chad. The International Criminal Court indicts Sudan’s head of state for 
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genocides of three tribes that the general public has never heard of. The hiatus between 
these charges and public knowledge shows the gap in reporting.
Overusing Celebrity Narratives
By following Bob Geldof and Bono, Angelina Jolie and Madonna as tour guides to world 
problems, media offer comic book versions of world problems and relief and adopt 
tabloid views of globalization. This to the dismay of social movements and NGOs who 
for decades have sought to present images of Africa emancipated and empowered and 
not as an object of charity. 
That media use and create celebrity is ordinary; stardust and glamour serve as emo-
tional glue and media offer emoticons with celebrities as props. Locales, regions and na-
tions are extended families of sorts and media provide their narratives. Through incessant 
repetition national narratives attain ‘thruthiness’ in the sense of generating a common 
sense. That celebrities and movie actors take up global engagement and articulate social 
responsibility is welcome and at times their ideas are smarter and more grounded than 
their media representations (cf. Richey and Ponte 2008 on the Product RED campaign). 
What is problematic, however, is media overusing celebrity to the point of distorting 
global relations. Thus, western discussions have been dominated by Gleneagles promises 
of debt relief for Africa, which a few years later turn out to be largely unmet. Discussions 
of international development have long been dominated by the Millennium Development 
Goals. A pattern is that the declaration of new targets and goals diverts attention from 
the circumstance that past targets have not been met. In response to Geldof and Bono 
escapades, entrepreneurs and investors note that by making Africa look like an object 
of charity they reduce the actual interest in investing in Africa. 
This is not where the energy is and this is not why the ship has been turning. Asian 
investment in Africa has been rising significantly. The main driver, of course, has been 
rising demand for commodities, but an additional factor is that, unlike the west, China 
and India have not been burdened by the mortgage of denigrating representations. 
Growth in several African countries has risen to 6 percent – after ‘lost decades’ of 
marginal or negative growth – largely due to demand and investments from the NICs 
in the south. The World Bank reports that ‘for the first time in three decades African 
economies are growing with the rest of the world’, which fuels ‘hopes of new business 
era in Africa’ (World Bank 2007; Russell 2007). Africa ‘is at the heart of the latest 
surge of enthusiasm to hit emerging markets. Factors: commodities boom, debt relief, 
improvements in economic policy. Private capital flows have tripled since 2003 (45 
billion in 2006)’ (Chung 2007).7
If we compare media north and south, the general tenor in media in the global south 
is more positive about the growing role of the south, more concerned with south-south 
cooperation, more impatient with the postwar power structure and more critical of 
western bias, as glancing at Al Jazeera or Al Arabiya programs or leafing through Front-
line, Dawn, Al Ahram, Daily Star, Uno Mas Uno or La Jornada shows. The common 
experience of western colonialism and neocolonialism obviously plays a role. Media in 
the south are also more aware of the ironies of western bias. Thus, the Times of India 
reports the story of a US Senator outsourcing a speech on the globalization of Oregon 
to a firm in Bangalore, India.8 Another trend in media in the global south is a growing 
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assertiveness. According to Chandran Nair, ‘Speak up, Asia, or the west will drown 
you out’: ‘What is needed is the emergence of a confident body of Asian intellectual 
leaders’ (2007). A Reuters story in the Hindustan Times is headlined ‘Stop lecturing us, 
India tells rich nations’.
The time has come for the developed world to attend to its own problems, and 
stop lecturing emerging economies about what is right and what is wrong, Finance 
Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram said on Monday. As growth looks sure to slow 
in much of the rich world, partly due to the fallout from reckless lending in the 
United States, new economic powerhouses like India say they are tired of being 
told what to do. “For too long the advanced economies have told the developing 
economies that this is right and this is wrong”, Chidambaram told Reuters on the 
sidelines of the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank. But his biggest criticism was of financial authorities in developed countries 
for not keeping up with the new and complex financial market instruments that lay 
behind recent credit market turmoil. “Their regulators have fallen behind. They 
are beginning to rethink their regulatory structure”, he said. “I am told in the UK 
there is urgent consideration of the fact that response is divided between three 
separate institutions – the Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England and 
the government. They want to know where the buck stops”, he said. “In the name 
of innovation, regulators or governments in the advanced economies have fallen 
behind the curve”, he said. “The lesson is that the model we have adopted, cau-
tious calibrated opening of the economy, is perhaps the right model.” “Regulation 
must stay one step ahead of innovation”, he added.9
Another instance of the south talking back is China’s human rights report on the United 
States. Drawing on Human Rights Watch, FBI reports, etc., the report criticizes American 
violent crime, its large prison population, police brutality, restrictions on workers’ rights 
to unionize and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.10 
Meanwhile, in one area at least mainstream media north and south tend to agree. 
‘Blessed are the poor’ according to one of the prophets, but not according to the world’s 
media, north and south. In the north, economic migrants or jobseekers from the south 
are easy targets for discrimination and accusations of crime. In the south, crime and 
disease are associated with poverty (e.g. Davis 2006). Middle class sensibilities and 
glitzy marketing aesthetics prevail in most of the world’s media (see Berger 2008).
BC/AC
Discussed above are major global divides that media uphold in the early twenty-first 
century. Whether media merely reflect and follow or create divides is a question that 
cannot be addressed here. Mainstream media underestimate and under-represent the rise 
of the rest. In this respect they differ from business media – which are keen to identify 
‘new champions’ (e.g. Sirkin et al. 2008) and in whose interest it is to do so, whether 
from the point of view of investment or competition. They differ also from intelligence 
agencies – CIA and American defense intelligence reports have long identified the ma-
jor economic and power realignments to come,11 but they don’t make popular reading. 
Mainstream media in representing the rise of the rest as a threat send the message if 
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globalization isn’t ours, then it isn’t. As long as this is the common sense in the west, it 
suggests the diagnosis ‘does not play well with others’.
Their representation of new emerging globalization meets the needs of conserva-
tive, complacent societies, a bourgeois response that enables bourgeois repose. It keeps 
horizons near and flat. How would conventional wisdom come to terms with the ironies 
of history? How would media represent self criticism and reflexivity? For all their influ-
ence, media are often windows of clichés, corridors of conventional wisdom, knowledge 
without depth, with occasional smart or probing editorial comments. Perspectives such 
as the American bubble and the European bubble vent regional narratives of power. 
To the extent that media are bubble media – display windows of collective narcissism 
in which world events figure as sidebars to national narratives – they institutionalize 
regional comfort zones. 
The crisis of 2008, however, has been a major game breaker and wakeup call for the 
‘masters of the universe’. There are marked differences in public discourses before and 
after the crisis, BC and AC. The discussion above portrays BC views.12 
Twenty-first century shifts manifest to a large extent as economic shifts with finance 
as a salient dimension and sovereign wealth funds as key players. The sovereign wealth 
funds mainly come from two sources, surplus accumulated through exports of manu-
factures, as in Japan, China and Korea, and energy exports, with the Arab Emirates and 
Norway in the lead, followed by other oil exporters. Before the crisis, perspectives on 
sovereign wealth funds followed the general American pattern of distrust of state institu-
tions. In 2005 the US congress vetoed China’s CNOOC’s bid to acquire the oil company 
Unocal. In 2006 congress overruled the Dubai Ports World holding company taking 
over the management of six US ports. Larry Summers voices the philosophy underlying 
this distrust. According to Larry Summers, sovereign wealth funds ‘shake the logic of 
capitalism’: ‘governments as shareholders … may want to see their national companies 
compete effectively, or to extract technology or to achieve influence’ (2008). What is 
wrong, actually, with governments seeking to build the national economy? In Europe 
industrial policy has been the norm; in East Asia the developmental state has been the 
path to success. But in the US the default ideology is ‘free enterprise’ and government 
‘picking winners’ is taboo in the American business ethos. Thus, Summers implicitly up-
holds a singular, American notion of capitalism and condemns forms of mixed economy. 
Obviously this American position is no longer tenable with banks, insurance companies 
such as AIG and Detroit automakers turning to government for support. The criticism 
that SWFs follow political rather than economic objectives doesn’t hold when politics 
and economics are no longer clearly distinguishable. Philip Stephens notes, ‘Broken 
banks put the state back in the driving seat’ and ‘government is no longer a term of 
abuse’ (Stephens 2008b).
After the crisis, the story lines begin to change. Their changing course also reflects 
five years or so of petrol prices close to $100 a barrel (2003-2008), so oil exporters are 
flush. The story is essentially simple: ‘Sovereign funds put cash in the banks’ (Financial 
Times, November 28, 2007). Funds from China to the Arab Emirates buy stakes in Wall 
Street banks. As the China Investment Corporation buys a 10 percent stake in Morgan 
Stanley for $5 billion and a 10 percent share of Blackstone, ‘the fund sees a unique op-
portunity in the credit crisis of developed markets’ (Anderlini 2007). It is not just Abu 
Dhabi buying Manhattan’s Chrysler building or sovereign wealth funds from China 
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and Singapore buying into Wall Street power houses; it is that the accumulation pat-
terns have changed. The portée of the intervention of sovereign wealth funds is that the 
2008 crisis ushers in the comeback of state regulated capitalism. At one stage sovereign 
wealth funds are shunned, next they are reluctantly allowed in, then they are embraced, 
next they are actively sought after, expected to take part in and drawn into institutions, 
or reprimanded for not taking part – much of this in the course of a year. Daniel Gross 
sums up the unfolding plot:
With U.S. banks and financial institutions retrenching in the wake of the subprime 
debacle, cash-seeking American hedge funds, private-equity firms and corpora-
tions will be booking passage for Beijing and Bahrain. “They [SWFs] have almost 
replaced U.S. pension funds as the principal source of capital for alternative invest-
ments”, says Michael Klein, chairman of Citigroup’s investment-banking unit.
The rising pace of SWF investment in blue-chip American companies will pro-
voke plenty of angst. SWFs operate with a Cheneyesque opacity. Americans 
tend to imagine free trade and globalization as McDonald’s in Riyadh and shoe 
factories in Vietnam producing cheap goods. But governments of nondemocratic 
countries in the Persian Gulf and Asia owning big chunks of America’s financial 
infrastructure? Not so much. (Gross 2007-2008)
Consider the shifting nuances in the headlines and story lines in the western business 
press from 2007 through 2008, at times with contradictory signals even on the same 
page or in the same article. 
• ‘Big spenders: how sovereign funds are stirring up protectionism’ (J. Willman) and 
‘Markets eye the new rich kids on the block’ (J. Chung, Financial Times, July 30, 
2007).
• ‘A passage to the west for sovereign wealth funds’ (J.F. Vail, Financial Times, October 
31, 2007).
• ‘Officialdom finds a new, unprincipled bogeyman’ (J. Dizard, Financial Times, No-
vember 27, 2007).
• ‘Sovereign funds should lend support to equities’ (Financial Times, December 13, 
2007).
• ‘Why SWFs will not fix the western financial mess’ (T. Jackson, Financial Times, 
December 17, 2007).
• ‘Credit crunch led to rapid rise of sovereign wealth fund investment in US and 
European banks’: since January 2007 Singapore’s Temasek spent $41.7 billion (in 
stakes in Merrill Lynch and Barclays), the UAE $10.7 billion and China $8 billion 
(Financial Times, March 24, 2008).
• ‘IMF clears way for development of sovereign wealth funds code’ (Wall Street Jour-
nal, March 24, 2008).
• ‘The wealth of nations is reflected in the stellar rise of sovereign wealth funds’ (Fi-
nancial Times, March 31, 2008).
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• ‘The new global wealth machine’ (New York Times, April 2, 2008).
• ‘Do not panic over foreign wealth’ (G. Rachman, Financial Times, April 29, 2008).
• ‘Reject sovereign wealth funds at your peril’ (Financial Times, June 6, 2008).
• ‘SWFs attract controversy but are part of the global solution’ (Arnab Das, Financial 
Times, July 23, 2008).
• ‘Managers eye Asian SWF billions’ (Financial Times, August 4, 2008).
• ‘Fifth of SWFs “unaccountable”’ (Financial Times, September 15, 2008). 
• ‘Global Investment: Exec Desperately Seeks SWF. Must be rich. No green card 
or English required. Send photos and balance sheets to Wall Street’ (Gross 2007-
2008).
There is a parallel to these changes in representations in the growing charm with Islamic 
finance instruments, with London, Amsterdam and other financial centers queuing up 
to provide the new instruments (Sullivan 2008). This echoes the pattern of Eurodollars 
in the 1970s with a twist: western institutions seeking to retrieve and corner the money 
that has gone into paying for the west’s energy habits.
Initially the emerging economies appeared to be safe from the impact of crisis,13 but 
gradually slackening demand not only in the US but also in Europe has begun to impact 
on emerging economies’ exports. Nandan Nilekani who heads India’s Infosys, adds a 
further twist: ‘we were riding on a global liquidity boom’. ‘Remove the “steroid”, as is 
happening now, and 2-3 percent of growth will go’. So the crisis also comes as a cor-
rective in emerging economies: ‘After a few years of 8 percent plus growth, we felt that 
we were already a superpower. We took credit for global factors, and took the foot off 
reforms’ (Nilekani 2008).
The crisis has accelerated the transition from the G8 to the G20. Initiated by French 
president Sarkozy, the G20 summit in November 2008 edges towards a new global 
balancing act including a greater role for major emerging societies. A Dutch newspaper 
headline during the summit reads, soberly, matter-of-factly, ‘G20 waits for new leader, 
preferably one with money’.14 The awareness that the American hegemon is bankrupt 
is spreading. 
The declining value of American assets through 2008 – such as Citigroup, Merrill 
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual – cost the sovereign wealth funds that 
went in early dearly. A November headline reads, ‘sovereign funds go cold on rescue 
finance’.15 Given continued uncertainty, sovereign wealth funds have become much more 
cautious. In turn, this has increased the political pressure for their involvement. 
The ambivalent rise of sovereign wealth funds in western media – tinged with anxiety 
and greed – is paralleled in changing representations of the ‘rise of Asia’. After the crisis 
the rise of the rest is gradually being represented in a slightly more positive light and 
we can probably anticipate more such changes. After all, one day the ‘new champions’ 
might be called to the rescue. A cover headline in The Economist asks ‘Can China save 
the world?’ (November 15-21, 2008). The question mark prevails, of course, but what 
is new is the question. It signals that the entire landscape has changed radically. If the 
IMF is to resume its role of stabilizing international finance it can only do so with new 
inflows of funds, in particular from Saudi Arabia and China. Hence a headline reads 
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‘UK confident Saudis will help IMF’ (Financial Times, November 3, 2008). As 2008 
draws to a close, Chinese sovereign wealth funds have announced their withdrawal from 
investing in western financial houses and Chinese officials lecture the American treasury 
on the importance of economic stability.16
Notes
 1. ‘Media and global divides’ was the theme of the International Association for Media and Communication 
Research annual conference in Stockholm July 2008. This article is an updated version of my keynote 
address. I have given versions of this talk at the Institute of Communication Studies at Punjab University 
and the South Asian Free Media Association in Lahore, November 2008. I am indebted to comments of 
Oscar Hemer (2008), Durre Ahmed and participants.
 2. Extensive discussion of twenty-first century globalization is in Nederveen Pieterse 2008b. Alice Amsden 
(2001) discussed the ‘rise of the rest’. Zakaria’s (2008) book The post-American world also takes up the 
‘rise of the rest’. These discussions go beyond American decline and open a different chapter.
 3. A case in point is the retired four-star Army general and military analyst of NBC News, Barry McCaf-
frey, who made thousands of appearances on MSNBC and other networks and had direct access to top 
US commanders, all the while being under lucrative contract with major military equipment suppliers. 
A detailed expose is D. Barstow, ‘One man’s military-industrial media complex’, New York Times, 
November 30, 2008: 1, 26-27.
 4. ‘Poll reveals backlash in wealthy countries against globalisation’, Financial Times, July 23, 2007: 1.
 5. In media studies see Curran and Park 2000.
 6. Extensive discussion is in Nederveen Pieterse 2007.
 7. On these relations see Kaplinsky and Messner 2008; Nederveen Pieterse and Rehbein 2009.
 8. ‘US Senator outsources speech to India’, Times of India, November 13, 2006.
 9. Hindustan Times, October 23, 2007.
 10. AP, ‘China calls U.S. record on rights “shocking”,’ International Herald Tribune, March 14, 2008: 3.
 11. According to the US National Intelligence Council’s report Global Trends 2005, released in 2008, ‘India 
and China could rise to join the US on top of a multipolar world in 2025’, reports The Times of India 
(November 22, 2008: 1). India will become the world’s fourth largest economy.
 12. In this script the global south is often blamed for the failure of international negotiations. Thus, according 
to a headline of Il Messagiero on the failure of the Doha round talks in Geneva in summer 2008, ‘Guerra 
Asia-USA, fallisce il WTO’ (July 30, 2008: 1).
 13. E.g. T. Fuller, ‘This time, Southeast Asia watches crisis from afar’, New York Times, November 22, 2008: 
5.
 14. De Volkskrant, November 15, 2008: 15.
 15. H. Sender, Financial Times, November 10, 2008: 15. 
 16. ‘China sovereign wealth group to stop investing in western banks’, December 4, 2008: 1. G. Dyer, ‘Chinese 
officials lecture Paulson’, December 5, 2008: 2.
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